




1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is a fact that in most of the countries (both currently and historically) the
wealthier a person is, the higher the amount that he or she has to pay in taxes.
This feature of a tax system was actually considered by Adam Smith as the ﬁrst
maxim of a good tax regime. In the Wealth of Nations (book 5, chapter 2, part
2), Smith stated this equality principle as:
“The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the
support of the government... in proportion to the revenue which
they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.”
On the other hand, the literature on the economy of the state proposes that:
• One important reason for the existence of states is that the society needs
an agent who can protect it from foreign predation.
• A good characterization of the behavior of the state must treat it as a
private enterprise, interested in maximizing the rents of the ruling elite.
• The focus of the research of constitutional political economists should be
the design of Constitutions that provide the state with the incentives to
do the job that it is supposed to.
In this paper, we attempt to associate all the previous ideas. We analyze the
problem in a very simple Principal-Agent framework. Under imperfect informa-
tion, we assume that the problem of the society is precisely to design a ﬁscal
constitution such that the state has the incentives to protect the wealth of the
society. The interesting result is that, under mild assumptions, such incentive
compatible constitution implies a strictly increasing dependance of taxes on the
∗This work was carried while I was at Brown University. Comments and suggestions by
Herschel Grossman and Vernon Henderson are gratefully appreciated.
1wealth of the tax payer1.A sab y - p r o d u c t ,w ea l s oﬁnd that such constitution
cannot be Pareto eﬃcient.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, some related literature
is reviewed. Then, the next two sections set up and solve the problem. As a
comparison benchmark, a Pareto eﬃcient constitution is derived. Those are the
two most important parts of the paper. The model has assumptions that range
from purely technical to strong economic simpliﬁcations. For that reason, before
stating the concluding remarks we discuss the assumptions and main weaknesses
of the paper. An appendix includes a related problem and the proof of one of
the results.
2 Some related literature
When explaining the reasons for the existence of the state, Grossman (1999)
quotes First Samuel 8:4-22, when the people of Israel request that the prophet
“make us a king...[who] may judge us, and ﬁght our battles...”
And Grossman further argues that
“...assuming that the citizenry has good reason to dread being
subjugated by another society more than it fears being exploited
by its own king, it is easy to understand why the citizenry perceives
itself to be better oﬀ with a state to “ﬁght our battles” than without
a state.”
This view of the problem is consistent with one of the two conﬂicting ways
to think about the relation between state and society — see Grossman (2000).
In this context, the state is basically conceived as an agent of the citizenry,
the latter being deﬁned as the group of people who are politically decisive. As
Rutten (1999) and Grossman (2000) point out, this may be problematic in the
sense that, in order for the state to be able to deter predation, it must be
endowed, by the society, with a high enough amount of power. Hence, nothing
guarantees that that same power will not be used against the citizenry. That
is the alternative view of the problem: the state becomes an instrument of the
politicians (considered as a class, the ruling elite).
We adopt the view that the state is an agent of the society, who is hired to
protect the wealth of the society from foreign predation. Our model is simple
enough to abstract from any other considerations, such as internal predation
(Grossman, 1999) or redistributional policies, which are likely to give results in
the same direction as ours. The view that we adopt is, thus, the same as in
Downs and Rocke (1994), where the state is the agent of the society that decides
whether or not to engage in war with other countries. In that paper, the authors
are concerned about how the society can get the state to engage in the same
1We will refer to this feature of a tax regime as increasing taxation.
2wars the they would engage, were they endowed with the same information as
its agent.
Here, we share the view in Down and Rocke (1994) that
“...the citizens of every state, democratic or not, have an interest
in trying to ensure that their chief executive makes decisions that
reﬂect their interests. This problem is particularly diﬃcult in the
areas of intervention and interstate conﬂict in which the chief exec-
utive is likely to have access to substantial amounts of information
not available to his or her constituency...”
However, we do not concentrate on the relative willingness of the state and
the citizenry to engage in wars. We take for granted that some predation by a
third agent (whom we will identify as foreigner) will occur, and recognize the
fact that the state maximizes an objective function which is increasing in the
diﬀerence between how much it can collect in taxes and how much it needs to
spend in defense. This is equivalent to the view in section 4 of Grossman (1999)
or Mendoza (1999).
In our economy, that is the type of abuse to which the state can submit its
citizenry. And that is the type of abuse that the citizenry will try to minimize,
when designing the constitution. Following Rutten (1999), in its interpretation
of the Hobbesian political ideas, political economists should study the mecha-
nisms through which the society would give the state the right incentives to do
its job. Our main result is that increasing taxation may be seen as one such
mechanism.
In that sense, this work can be seen as what Buchanan (1991) deﬁnes as
Constitutional Political Economy, in the sense that what we do here is to study
the possibility that agents have to impose constraints, rather than the usual
analysis in economics, where the object of study is how the agents behave, given
the constraints that they face. Moreover, our view of constitutional politics is
“contractarian”, in the sense that it focuses on interests rather than on theories.
That is, we adhere to the von Neumann-Morgenstern paradigm, and deal with
the problem of what agents predict will happen in the future by the usual
treatment of mathematical expectations. Our main concern is, then, what the
objectives of the agents are and, given those, how one of the players (the society,
our principal) can give the correct incentives to the other one (the state, our
agent).
3 The State as Agent of the Society
The Economy consists of a representative agent and a government. The only
public good is the defense of the property of the citizenry from predation by an
agent whom we identify as a foreigner.
33.1 The society
The society is represented by a Bernoulli utility function U : R+ −→ R,w h i c h
depends on the wealth that the society keeps after paying taxes and after being
preyed on by the foreign agent. Let p denote the proportion of the wealth of
the society that is left after predation by the foreigner. Let τ denote the taxes
paid by the society. Let W0 denote the initial wealth of the society. We will
normalize W0 =1 ,b u t ,n o n e t h e l e s s ,d e n o t eb ypW0 the gross ﬁnal wealth of
the society, whenever the presence of W0 makes the equations more intuitive.
T h u s ,w ew i l ld e n o t e
U = U (pW0 − τ) (1)
Assumption U1: For all X ∈ R+, U0 (X) > 0 and U00 (X) < 0.
The following boundedness assumption is made for technical convenience.
Assumption B1: There exists U ∈ R such that, ∀X ∈ R+, |U (X)| < U.
3.2 Predation Technology:
The proportion of its wealth that the society keeps depends on how much the
government spends in defense, S, and how much the foreign predator spends in
predation, θ.W e s u p p o s e t h a t S ∈ R,a n dt h a tθ is a random variable with
support Ω ⊆ R and distribution G : Ω −→ [0,1].W ea s s u m et h a tG is absolutely
continuous, and denote by g its density function.
Then, p : R × Ω −→ [0,1] is deﬁned by p = p(S,θ).
Assumption T1: p(S,θ) is continuous with
∂p(S,θ)
∂S > 0,a n d
∂p(S,θ)
∂θ < 0
In assumption T1, continuity is assumed for technical convenience, whereas
the derivatives have the intuition we want: the more the state spends in defense
and the less the foreign predator spends in predation, the larger the proportion
of its wealth that the society keeps.
3.3 Institutions:
We assume that it is the society who designs the constitution, and the gov-
ernment who decides the expenditure in defense S. We also assume that both
of them obey the constitution and that the society cannot directly observe the
amount S nor the amount θ, but only the amount p, from which none of the
former is discernible2.
Deﬁnition 1 A constitution is a function τ :[ 0 ,1] −→ R,t h a td e ﬁnes, for each
proportion of the wealth of the society that is left after predation by the foreigner,
p,a na m o u n tτ (p) of taxes that the society must pay to the government.
2Usually, the society observes some statistics about S that are produced by the state and
controlled by an agency that is likely to be under the inﬂuence of politicians. In reality, this
statistics may, nonetheless, have some credibility. Here we assume that they have none or,
futhermore, that they do not exist.
4Thus, all the institutional-legal regime of our economy is given by the con-
stitution τ (p). τ does not directly depend on S or θ, since none of them is
observable. However, the following concept will be useful in some of the analy-
ses:
Deﬁnition 2 Given a constitution τ, a pseudo-constitution is a function ιτ,ϕ :
Φ −→ R, for some set Φ, such that there exists a mapping ϕ : Φ −→ [0,1] and
ιτ,ϕ = τ ◦ ϕ.
Remark 3 In particular the two following classes of pseudo-constitutions are
of interest:
• Let Φ = R × Ω,a n dϕ = p(S,θ),s ot h a te τ (S,θ)=τ ◦ p is a pseudo-
constitution. This pseudo-constitution is interesting whenever both S and
θ are variable but observable.
• Let Φ = Ω, and for any ﬁxed b S ∈ R let ϕ = p(b S,θ),s ot h a tb τ b S (θ)=
τ ◦ p(b S,θ) deﬁnes a pseudo-constitution. This one is interesting when S
is ﬁxed and θ is observable.
3.4 The State
The state is the agent of the society in determining S. We assume, however,
that the objective function of the politicians is to maximize the utility they
derive from their wealth, which, we assume, is not subject to predation. Let W1
be their initial wealth, and suppose that the Bernoulli function V : R+ −→ R
represents their preferences3. Thus, we denote
V = V (W1 + τ − S) (2)
Assumption V1: For all X ∈ R, V 0 (X) > 0 and V 00 (X) < 0.
For technical reasons, we assume the following:
Assumption B2: There exists V ∈ R such that, ∀X ∈ R, |V (X)| < V .
3.5 The Constraints:
3.5.1 Technological and Institutional Constraints:
Both the state and the society take as given the fact that p is determined by
the function p(S,θ). Also, since we assume that both of them are constrained
by the constitution, they take as given the fact that τ is given by τ (p). Then,




Eθ (V (W1 + τ (p) − S)) s.t. p = p(S,θ) (3)
3According to van Winden (1983), when describing a State we need to deﬁne four features
of it: the interests of the politicians, the distribution of power among them, the instruments
available to them and the constraints they face. Here, the ﬁrst is given by equation (2), the
second is irrelevant as we assumed a uniﬁed ruling elite, the third is simply S,a n dt h ef o u r t h
is the object of the next subsection.




Eθ (U (pW0 − τ (p))) s.t. p = p(S,θ) (4)
w h e r ew eu s et h en o t a t i o nhτ (p)ip∈[0,1] to remark the fact that the problem of
the society is to choose the whole function τ (p),s ot h a tEθ (U (pW0 − τ (p)))
is a von Neumann-Morgenstern functional of τ (p).
3.5.2 Economic Constraints: the Constraints to Constitutional Pol-
icy.
When designing the constitution, the society faces two constraints:
• Individual rationality constraint: We assume that if politicians were not in
oﬃce, they would have an expected utility of V . Hence, any constitution
must guarantee them at least this level of expected utility.
• Incentive compatibility constraint: Since the society does not observe S,
but only p, it will want to design a constitution which is free of moral
hazard, whenever this problem may be an issue.
4 The Design of the Constitution;
4.1 Pareto Eﬃcient Constitutions:
In order to have a Paretian benchmark, we assume for the moment that there
are no informational problems, so that the society itself determines both the
amount of taxes paid and the expenditure in defense. Since S is observable,
incentives are not an issue, and the constitutional design problem reduces to
determining S as well as the pseudo-constitution b τ : Ω −→ R.T h ep r o b l e mi s
max
{hb τ(θ)iθ∈Ω,S}
Eθ (U (p(S,θ)W0 − b τ (θ))) (5)
s.t.
Eθ (V (W1 + b τ (θ) − S)) ≥ V (6)
and, letting λ>0 denote the shadow price of the Individual Rationality con-
straint, the ﬁrst order conditions are given by the continuum of equations4








W0 − λV 0 (·)
¶
g(θ)dθ =0 (8)
4By Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, Assumptions B1 and B2 allow us to take
the derivative of the integral as the integral of the derivative. This one of the reasons why
those conditions are imposed.








= λEθ (V 0 (·)) (9)








= Eθ (V 0 (·))
Here, the left hand side is the expected marginal social utility of expendi-
ture in defense5, whereas the right hand side is the expected marginal cost for
the state. Pareto eﬃciency requires, then, that the state “internalizes” all the
marginal eﬀects of the defense expenditures on the society.
4.2 The Moral Hazard problem:
Obviously, the crux of the problem is that the amount of defense expenditure
is neither decided nor observed by the society. The state takes the constitution
as given and determines S by the solution to the problem
max
S
Eθ (V (W1 + τ (p(S,θ)) − S)) (10)
which has as ﬁrst order condition
Eθ
µ




= Eθ (V 0 (·)) (11)
in which the state equates its expected marginal utility and cost. The loss in
Pareto eﬃciency comes from the presence of τ0 (·) on the left hand side of the
equation. One could be tempted to say that the problem is trivially solved by
the society by setting a linear constitution. If the state is risk averse, that is
incorrect since it would share risk ineﬃciently, as we observe in appendix 7.16.
4.3 Sound Constitutional Economics (or “An Incentive
Compatible Constitution”):
Given the moral hazard problem, the society has to incorporate incentive com-
patibility constraints in the design of the second-best constitution. This only
5By social we do not mean, as is usual in welfare economics, the aggregate across agents
of marginal utilities. What we mean here is the marginal utility of the society, as principal of
the problem.
6In terms of what follows, for the Society to meet the individual rationality constraint of
the State with a linear constitution would in general require taxes that are suboptimal from
its point of view (too high). In other words, a linear constitution is too costly an incentive
mechanism.
7means that the society recognizes the fact that politicians are rational agents
maximizing their own expected utility functions. When doing sound consti-
tutional politics, people need to incorporate this as a constraint and design
the best possible constitution that is both individually rational and incentive
compatible.
Before proceeding, it turns out to be convenient7 to redeﬁne the stochastic
process of the problem: given p = p(S,θ), we can invert the function as θ =















and we can construct the function H :[ 0 ,1] × R −→ [0,1],d e ﬁned by
H (p,S)=1− G(θ(S,p)) (12)
In this context, p becomes the random variable and S is a control. Thus, we
denote by H (p|S) ≡ H (p,S) the distribution function of p conditional on S9.
















Deﬁnition 4 For S0,S 1 ∈ R, H (p|S0) is said to dominate H (p|S1) in the
ﬁst degree stochastic dominance sense if ∀p ∈ [0,1], H (p|S1) ≥ H (p|S0),a n d
∃p ∈ [0,1] for which H (p|S1) >H(p|S0).
Theorem 5 If S0 >S 1,t h e nH (p|S0) dominates H (p|S1) in the ﬁrst degree
stochastic dominance sense.
Proof. It follows directly from deﬁnition 4 and equation (14).
7Holstrom (1979).
8Assumption T1 allows us to use it.
9To check that H(·) is a bona ﬁde distribution function, notice that ∀S, p →∞implies
θ → inf Ω so that G(θ(·)) → 0 and H (·) → 1. On the other hand, p →− ∞implies θ → supΩ
so that G(θ(·)) → 1 and H (·) → 0. Right-continuity and monotonicity of H (·) follow from
those of G(·) and p(·)
8Lemma 6 If S0 >S 1, then for any constitution, τ (p),w i t hτ0 (p) < 1,w eh a v e
Ep (U (pW0 − τ (p))|S0) >E p (U (pW0 − τ (p))|S1)
Proof. If τ0 (p) < 1,t h e n
dU(·)
dp = U0 (.)(1− τ0 (p)) > 0 and the result follows
directly from theorem 1 in Hadar and Rusell (1971), given assumption B1 and
theorem 5.
The intuition of the theorem and the lemma are simple. The more the state
spends in defense, the higher is the likelihood of better results for the society, in
the sense of keeping a higher proportion of its initial wealth. If the society has
to pay taxes that increase in a less than one-to-one basis with the wealth they
keep, then they beneﬁt from the redistribution of the probability mass toward
higher values of p.
Assumption MLR: We assume that the induced distribution function H (p|S)









Assumption MLR says10 that if the society has a prior distribution of beliefs
about the level of S, which is updated (in a Bayesian manner) after observing
p, then the higher the observed p, the “better” the conditional posterior in the
sense of ﬁrst degree stochastic dominance. In other words, after observing high
p, the society believes that it is more “likely” that the government spent a high
S,t h a na f t e ro b s e r v i n gal o wp.
In this context, the problem of the society is:
max
{hτ(p)ip∈[0,1],S}
Ep (U (pW0 − τ (p))) (15)
s.t.







W1 + τ (p) − b S
´´
(17)
Assumption B3: There exists V
0
∈ R such that |V 0| < V
0
.
Let AV (·) denote the degree of absolute risk aversion of the politicians:
AV (W1 + τ (p) − S)=−
V 00 (W1 + τ (p) − S)
V 0 (W1 + τ (p) − S)
Assumption DAR: For all w ∈ R+,w eh a v et h a t0 ≥ A0
V (·).
Assumption V2: Given W1 ∈ R+ and τ (p),f o ra l lS ∈
"
















¯ ¯ ¯b S
´
dp




9Assumption B3 is purely technical11. Assumption DAR says that the politi-
cians have nonincreasing absolute risk aversion; that is that the richer they are,
the lower (or constant) has to be the compensation they would ask in order to


















¯ ¯ ¯b S
´
dp
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
b S=S
=0












¯ ¯ ¯b S
´
dp
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
b S=S
=0 (18)
and we know that S really is a maximizer and not only a critical point. This is
the usually called “ﬁrst-order approach.”
The ﬁrst order conditions of the problem are equations (16), (18), the con-
tinuum ∀p ∈ [0,1]





h(p|S) − V 00 (·)h(p|S)
¶
=0 (19)








¯ ¯ ¯b S
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dp



















where (18) has already been introduced. Here, λ>0 is the shadow price of
constraint (16) and µ is the one of constraint (18). The sign of µ still has to be
determined. Reexpressing (19), we get
U0 (pW0 − τ (p))
V 0 (W1 + τ (p) − S)





+ A(W1 + τ (p) − S)
#
(21)
11Together with assumption B2, it allows us to take the second derivative of the integral
as the integral of the second derivative (in this case, the conditions need to be stronger than













and that ∀p ∈ [0,1], ¯ ¯ ¯V
0h(p|S)
¯ ¯ ¯ ≥
¯ ¯V 0 (·)h(p|S)
¯ ¯
and ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯V
∂h(p|S)
∂S
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≥
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯V (·)
∂h(p|S)
∂S
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
and ﬁnally apply Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence theorem.
10Theorem 7 Under all our assumptions, µ>0.
Proof. See appendix 7.2.
Theorem 8 Under all our assumptions, if τ (p) is the optimal individually ra-
tional incentive compatible constitution, then τ0 (p) > 0.













(V 0(·))2 + A0 (·)
The numerator of the expression is negative, given U00 (·) < 0, theorem 7 and
assumption MLR. The denominator is negative, given U00 (·) < 0, V 00 (·) < 0,
and assumption DAR.
Theorem 8 is the main result of the paper. What it shows is that if the state
is risk averse, under weak assumptions a strictly increasing ﬁscal constitution
is designed by the society, in order to give the state incentives to protect the
wealth of its people. In view of this result, the pray of the people of Israel to
the Prophet Samuel should have been: “make us a king who might ﬁght our
battles, but let that King know that heavy taxation will be paid only when He




Several assumptions have been made in this paper. We now discuss them.
5.1.1 Technical assumptions:
First and second order boundedness assumptions (B1, B2 and B3), as well as
the assumption of continuity of the predation technology (in assumption T1),
and the strict concavity assumption V2, are purely technical. Some of them
may indeed be unattractive, but one must notice that they are only suﬃcient
conditions. In speciﬁc cases, one could dispose of them, provided that the
mathematical procedures that they facilitated are still permissible.
The monotone likelihood ratio and decreasing absolute risk aversion assump-
tions (MLR and DAR) have technical content, since they are suﬃcient to deter-
mine the sign with which theorem 8 is concerned. However, they have economic
meaning, as we tried to argue when we introduced them. In our opinion, those
two assumptions are plausible12.
12In fact, standard functional forms, as the exponential density function or the logarithmic
Bernoulli utility function satisfy those conditions.
11Finally, the risk aversion assumptions of both the citizenry and the politi-
cians (U1 and V1) are more than only technical. If we do not assume it for the
former, the optimal constitution may be ﬂat. If we do not assume it for the
latter, the state acts as full insurer of the society. Both results are unattractive.
Whether the assumptions are plausible or not is left to the reader.
5.1.2 Political Economy Assumptions:
We have assumed that both the citizenry and the politicians take the constitu-
tion as a binding constraint. This may be naive on both sides of the problem.
One observes tax evasion and government misappropriation much more often
than one would like. Also, we have assumed that there is a representative con-
sumer and that the executive cannot be put out of oﬃc e . W er e c o g n i z et h o s e
as limitations of the paper, but try to justify them.
Trying to study increasing taxation in a representative agent model, in which
redistributional policy makes little sense, is, at least, an oversimpliﬁcation. How-
ever, the fact that we obtain a increasing taxation result, even without further
elements of the issue, should tell us that this isolated eﬀect can only add to
the traditional arguments. And in this context, in which there is only one tax
payer, tax evasion is less important than in a realistic multi-agent case.
On the other hand, the usual criticism — Rutten (1999), Grossman (2000) —
that there is no reason why the state would not abuse its power to overthrow the
constitution can also be somewhat avoided. In Grossman and Noh (1990) and
Hess and Orphanides (1999) the probability that the state will survive depends
on the quality of the exercise of the executive while in oﬃce. Our simplifying
assumption may be understood as an extreme case of that argument, where the
probability of survival is one if the constitution is obeyed, and zero otherwise.
Finally, it is obvious that the scope of this paper is, and has to be, limited.
The range of arguments for the existence of the state is broad, and so are the
functions that derive from those arguments. In that sense, the following self-
criticism of Downs and Rocke (1994) applies here:
“... to the extent that other issues are more important..., the
model will be incomplete.”
6C o n c l u s i o n s :
The goal of the paper was to link the ﬁrst maxim of taxation of Adam Smith,
a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c ht h er i c h e rt h et a xp a y e rt h em o r et a x e sh eo rs h em u s tp a y ,
with the existence of the state, and the possibility that the latter may abuse its
power. The main result that we obtain is theorem (8). In our extremely simple
model, in which the state is created with the sole goal of protecting the wealth of
the society from predation by a third agent, but there is imperfect information
about the actions of that agent, taxes that are strictly increasing in the wealth
of the tax payer arise as the optimal incentive compatible constitution that the
society designs. Hence, the ﬁrst maxim need not only be about fairness: it is
12also a mechanism by which the citizenry gives the executive the incentives to
protect its wealth. The assumptions that are made are, in our opinion, weak.
Moreover, one could broaden the applicability if the type of result that we
have obtained here. First, there is no reason why the predator has to be a
foreign agent. It could very well be the case of domestic thieves who neither
participate on the political processes of the society, nor pay taxes. In this case,
S would be understood as expenditure in security and our result would hold
unaltered. Secondly, we could abstract altogether from the predation problem
and understand p, or some function of it, as an indicator of the qualitative
performance of the economy. As long as doing good economic policy may be
costly for the state (S), all our conclusions would apply upon reinterpretation13.
In general, increasing taxation should appear as the second best individually
rational-incentive compatible constitution, whenever some action of the state,
which is costly to it, positively inﬂuences the wealth or income of its society.
As a by-product, the imperfections on the availability of information, which
lie in the heart of our argument, imply that such constitution is not Pareto
Eﬃcient. But the Pareto Eﬃcient Constitutions would not be give the right
incentives to the politicians and are, therefore, inferior from the point of view
of the citizenry.
7A p p e n d i x :
7.1 The Risk-Sharing problem
Consider the setting where θ is the random primitive variable. Since τ depends
on p,w h i c h ,f o rag i v e nS, depends on θ, the problem of designing the Consti-
tutions embeds one of optimal risk-sharing. To isolate this aspect, we take S as





























where W1 = W1 − S.
Let λ ∈ R++ denote the shadow price of the individual rationality constraint.
The ﬁrst order conditions of the problem are the continuum deﬁned by14
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13In this case, some simpliﬁcation could be done. If V can be assumed as additively separable
in W1 + τ (p) and S, one does not need to assume decreasing abosolute risk aversion in order
to prove theorem 8 and the proof of theorem 7 comes directly from Holstrom (1979).
14See footnote 5.










U00 (·)+λV 00 (·)
and the result follows from assumptions U1, V1, T1.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 7
Here, we proof theorem 7 in the text. The proof is based on Holstrom (1979)
although it is somewhat diﬀerent.
Proof. Recall the ﬁrst order condition (21)
U0 (pW0 − τ (p))
V 0 (W1 + τ (p) − S)








V 00 (W1 + τ (p) − S)
V 0 (W1 + τ (p) − S)
#
(remember that this is part of the ﬁrst order conditions, so that S can be taken
as ﬁxed) and deﬁne the sets
∆+ = {p ∈ [0,1] | Z (p) ≥ 0}
∆− = {p ∈ [0,1] | Z (p) < 0}
since λ is a constant, consider the problem15
max
hτ(p)ip∈[0,1]
Ep (U (pW0 − τ (p)) + λV (W1 + τ (p) − S))
which has as ﬁrst order condition, ∀p ∈ [0,1]
U0 (pW0 − τλ (p))
V 0 (W1 + τλ (p) − S)
= λ
w h e r ew eu s eλ as a subscript to distinguish τλ (p) of τ (p).D i ﬀerentiation of
the continuum with respect to p gives
τ0
λ (p)=
U00 (·)V 0 (·)
U00 (·)V 0 (·)+V 00 (·)U0 (·)
∈ [0,1)
Now, in order to argue by contradiction of our hypothesis, suppose 0 ≥ µ.
Then, ∀p ∈ ∆+ we have, since W0 =1 ,
U0 (p − τλ (p))
V 0 (W1 + τλ (p) − S)
= λ ≥
U0 (p − τ (p))
V 0 (W1 + τ (p) − S)
15Arrow (1971, Appendix to Essay 8), shows that the solutions to this problem are Pareto
eﬃcient. Since we are not imposing individual rationality, this solution need not be the same
as the optimal risk-sharing Constitution.
14and for ﬁxed p we have that
U0 (pW0 − τ (p))
V 0 (W1 + τ (p) − S)
is increasing in τ (p).S ot h a t∀p ∈ ∆+, τλ (p) ≥ τ (p).
A similar analysis gives us that ∀p ∈ ∆−, τ (p) ≥ τλ (p).
Now, notice further that p ∈ ∆− =⇒
∂h(p|S )














but, by Lemma 6, since τ0
λ (p) < 1,w ea l s oh a v e
1 Z
0











Now, consider equation (20). We have just shown that the ﬁrst term in the left
hand side is strictly positive. By assumption C2, we must then have µ>0.
This is inconsistent with the assumption 0 ≥ µ. Then, we conclude µ>0.
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